locations, time trend, and initial level of environmental performance, the analysis finds that firms covered by Green Watch improve their environmental performance more than non-covered firms. Bad performers improve more than good performers, and moderately noncompliant firms improve more than firms that are significantly out of compliance. The reasons for these different responses seem to be that the strengths of incentives that the disclosure program provides to the polluters at different levels of compliance are different and the abatement costs of achieving desired levels of ratings are different for different firms.
Introduction
Environmental performance rating and disclosure (PRD) has emerged as a substitute or complement for traditional pollution regulation, especially in developing countries [6] [28] [31] .
Indonesia's PROPER (Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating), initiated in June 1995, was the first PRD program in developing countries. Because of its perceived overall success, as measured by reduced emissions at a lower regulatory cost, many countries have established similar programs for a variety of industry sectors and pollutants in diverse economic, institutional and cultural settings. These programs include the Philippines' EcoWatch, India's Green Rating Project, China's Green Watch, Vietnam's Green Bamboo, Ghana's EPRD, and Ukraine's PRIDE. PRD programs are particularly attractive for developing countries because institutional weaknesses hinder conventional monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and standards [8] , and because PRD programs have lower regulatory costs [6] .
The literature on the effectiveness of PRD programs is very limited and falls into two groups.
The first compares the environmental performance ratings of firms before and after a program is implemented, and ascribes any ratings improvements to the program [1] . However, this approach may be confounded by time-varying factors such as technology improvements. The second group compares polluting emissions from rated and unrated firms, and credits performance improvements by rated firms to the program. However, this approach may be confounded by selection bias (e.g., firms with better environmental performance may be more likely to be rated).
It is rare to have pollution data for both rated and unrated firms before and after implementation of a PRD program. Garcia et al. [10] [11] assess the effectiveness of Indonesia's PROPER using measured pollution from rated and unrated firms, both ex ante and ex post. Their 2007 study suggests that PROPER has reduced emissions intensity, with a particularly rapid and strong impact on firms that have poor initial compliance records. Their 2009 study finds a strong reactive response during the first six months of disclosure, followed by a more moderate, but still significant, longer-run response as management adjusts to the new regime.
This study extends PRD assessment to China, using panel data on pollution from rated and unrated firms, before and after implementation of the Green Watch program. Our work offers two main contributions to the literature. First, we exploit the panel structure of the data to control for confounding factors such as time-variant technology improvement and selection bias between rated and unrated firms. Second, we go beyond a single measure of environmental performance to consider the impact of ratings disclosure on several measures, including emissions intensity and effluent concentrations for a variety of air and water pollutants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, focusing on the role of PRD programs in developing countries. Section 3 describes China's Green Watch program, while Section 4 describes our survey instrument and provides descriptive statistics for major variables. Section 5 presents our estimation model and results, and Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
Previous research
The literature on pollution control policies includes extensive work on command-andcontrol, market-based and information-based instruments [6] ]. Command-and-control instruments are often inefficient and ineffective in developing countries, because firms may fail to report adequately, regulators may lack the technical and administrative capacity for effective monitoring and enforcement, and judicial systems may be weak and/or corrupt. These same weaknesses limit regulators' ability to employ market-based instruments, which also work less effectively in countries where market failures are common and legal and institutional supports for formal market activities are weak.
Information-based instruments can be effective in developing countries where strong regulatory institutions and/or well-developed markets are absent, but where enough information can be reliably obtained to provide credible performance ratings. In practice, diverse information programs have served as complements to command-and-control and market-based instruments [21] . Information programs reduce the information asymmetry between polluters and environmental stakeholders (consumers, communities, NGOs, investors), empowering these stakeholders to pressure polluters for improved environmental performance [5] [17] [26] . When implemented correctly, information instruments promote better interaction and dialogue among firms, stakeholders and regulators [10] .
Information instruments also leverage markets in significant ways. An extensive empirical literature suggests that disclosure of firms' bad environmental performance reduces their stock prices both in developed countries [8] [14] [19] [23], [24] and developing countries such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines [7] . Jackson [16] and Boyle and Kiel [4] review the impacts of disclosure on housing prices in the US, which are found to be lower near Superfund sites [22] [29] , hazardous waste sites [30] , non-hazardous landfills [25] , nuclear radiation sources [9] , and polluting manufacturing plants [11] . Housing prices also respond to publicized environmental contamination incidents [19] [20] .
Information instruments have diverse forms, including reports of measured pollution, environmental accident reports, and environmental performance ratings. In the US, for example, the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) discloses toxic chemical releases and waste management activities by significant toxic polluters and federal facilities. In developing countries, however, weak regulatory institutions may have difficulty in implementing such emissions inventories. In addition, despite an emerging literature on stakeholders' role in improving firms' environmental performance [2] [3] [27] [33] , concerns remain about the public's ability to understand and utilize complex emissions reports. For example, Bui and Mayer [5] find that the release of TRI's highly-detailed information on facilities' toxic emissions has virtually no effect on housing prices in neighboring areas, even when the release of such information is unexpected. The dual problems of emissions inventories in developing countries -technical feasibility and public understanding -have led to a preference for programs that condense complex information into environmental performance ratings that are disclosed to the public.
Research on the effectiveness of performance rating and disclosure (PRD) programs suggests that that have a significant, positive impact on regulatory compliance [ Dasgupta et al. [6] summarize the changes in compliance rates for several PRD programs in Asia. During the first and second years after inception, compliance rates among covered firms increased from 37% to 61% in Indonesia, 8% to 58% in the Philippines, 10% to 24% in Vietnam, 75% to 85% in Zhenjiang, China and 23% to 62% in Hohhot, China.
Several empirical studies also find that PRD programs have improved firms' environmental performance in Indonesia [1] [10] [11] and China [32] . However, data constraints generally limit these studies to comparisons of environmental ratings before and after program implementation, or comparisons of compliance status between rated and unrated firms. Unfortunately, intertemporal rating comparisons are subject to confounding effects from time-varying factors such as technology change, while cross-sectional comparisons can be subject to significant selection bias.
China's Green Watch Program
Despite long-standing efforts to control pollution with traditional regulatory instruments, China continues to have severe pollution problems. This has led China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) to test the effectiveness of environmental performance rating and disclosure in a program supported by the World Bank. In 1999, SEPA launched its Green Watch program in Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu Province and Hohhot City, Inner Mongolia Autonomous District. Zhenjiang implemented a relatively complex rating system, as shown in Figure 1 , while Hohhot used a simpler rating system that was suited to its lower level of economic and institutional development (Wang et al., 2004) . As shown in Figure 1 , Green Watch in Jiangsu rates firms' environmental performance from best to worst in five colorsgreen for superior performance; blue for full compliance; yellow for meeting major compliance standards but violating some minor requirements; red for violating important standards; and black for more extreme non-compliance.
Green Watch ratings provide incentives for firms to improve their environmental performance in a comprehensive way. The primary benchmarks for ratings are China's emission and discharge standards that specify effluent concentration limits. Firms violating any of these standards are rated red, and firms violating standards in more than 60% of inspections are rated black. The secondary benchmarks are China's load-based emission and discharge standards.
Firms that satisfy the primary benchmarks but violate the secondary standards are rated yellow.
The ratings system also incorporates other performance indicators, including hazardous waste disposal practices, solid waste recycling, pollution accidents, public complaints, internal management requirements, China cleaner production certificates, ISO 14000 certificates, administrative penalties, and other citations for illegal activity. For each indicator, the system specifies a link to ratings that is clear, unambiguous and publicly available. Overall, the available evidence suggests a positive impact for the program. Table 1 shows that in Zhenjiang, the percentage of firms with positive ratings (green, blue and yellow) increased from 75% in 1999 to 85% in 2000. The most significant changes were in the extremely-noncompliant black group, whose percentage dropped from 11% in 1999 to 2% in 2000, and a major shift from the partially-compliant yellow group (44% to 22%) to the fully-compliant blue group (27% to 61%).
Evidence for the Green Watch program in Jiangsu Province indicates both increasing
participation by firms and improvement in their compliance rates. As shown in Table 1 Table 1 suggests that Green Watch ratings provide a strong improvement incentive for noncompliant (red and black) firms, with stronger effects on firms with red ratings (moderate noncompliance) than those with black ratings (extreme noncompliance).
Data
This study utilizes a pollution dataset for both rated and unrated firms during the period 1996-2001 in four cities of Jiangsu province (Huaian, Wuxi, Yangzhou, and Zhenjiang). Table 3 shows that 36.7% of the firms in the sample were rated by Green Watch. The majority of rated firms were assigned blue (60.38%) and yellow (22.37%); only a few earned the best (green) rating (2.96 %) or the worst (black -2.96%). The distributions are similar across cities, with the majority of firms rated blue and yellow, and very few green and black.
Multivariate analysis
Our pollution data are sufficiently detailed to permit assessment of Green Watch for both water and air pollution, measured by intensity and effluent concentration. Pollution intensity is total emissions divided by the gross value of output. We use total suspended solids (TSS), chemical oxygen demand (COD) and generated waste water to measure water pollution, and sulfur dioxide (SO2), waste gas, and dust and smoke to measure air pollution.
The dependent variables in our multivariate analyses are changes in pollution intensity and concentration for different pollutants. Let pollution intensity be specified as Y i,t for firm i in year 
where F it and C it are vectors of characteristics of the firm and the city; R it is a vector that incorporates both rating status (rated or unrated) and color-category assignments for rated firms; t is a time trend; µ i represents unobserved firm effects ; and ε it is a random error term.
Endogeneity is not a serious problem in this case, because ratings released in year t are based on multi-dimensional performance observations during year t -1.
If sample firms were randomly assigned to rated and unrated groups, we would not expect a statistical difference in intergroup pollution at t -1, before the first Green Watch disclosure in period t. Assessing prior randomness is complicated in this case by the distributions of pollution intensity and effluent concentration. Both are highly skewed, with skewness coefficients ranging from 3 to 9. In this case, the traditional student t test for equality of pre-rating group means is not appropriate. We employ the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for equal means and the K-sample test for equal medians. Our results, reported in Table 4 , show that significant differences in means and medians are common in the sample. In Zhenjiang, where Green Watch began in 1999, we find significant differences in mean and/or median pollution intensities for waste water, COD and dust and smoke, and significant differences in mean and/or median effluent concentrations for TSS, COD and dust and smoke. Table 4 reports similar findings for the other three sample cities (Huaian, Wuxi and Yangzhou), where the first public disclosure of ratings occurred in early 2001. 3 In light of these results, it is appropriate to introduce controls for pre-program pollution in our estimating equation:
To determine the appropriate estimator, we employ Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (BPLM) tests for random effects. We reject the null hypothesis in favor of the random effects model for air pollution intensities, and for air and water effluent concentrations. We assume that ε it is correlated across firms within a city but uncorrelated across firms in different cities. Tables 5 and 7 , we test whether a firm reduces pollution simply because it is rated. A priori, it is possible that self-scrutiny by a rated firm results in better environmental management and reduced pollution, even if the firm's rating is good. Our results for the regression variable PRD are consistent with this hypothesis: PRD rating has a negative impact on pollution for all equations in Tables 5 and 7 , and a statistically significant impact on TSS and SO2 for pollution intensity, and dust and smoke for effluent concentration. Tables 6 and 8 provide more insight, by identifying specific color ratings for firms. Here we find very strong results for water pollution intensity (TSS and COD) and dust-and-smoke intensity in Table 6 , with highly-significant reductions for poorly-rated firms that are much larger than reductions for firms with better ratings. Intensities generally decline more among rated firms for the other pollutants as well, but without the striking differential for poorly-rated firms. The same general pattern holds in Table 8 , with generally-declining effluent concentrations across all rated firms and the largest impacts among poorly-rated firms. Although some concentration results are highly significant, the overall significance level is somewhat lower than for pollution intensities. Across both tables, red-rated firms exhibit stronger responses than black-rated firms.
Summary and conclusions
This study has employed a new panel data set to test the impact of environmental performance rating and disclosure (PRD) on polluting firms in China. The data include ex ante and ex post pollution measures for both rated and unrated firms, enabling us to control for confounding factors such as time-variant technology improvement and selection bias. Our results strongly suggest that Green Watch has significantly reduced pollution from rated firms, with particularly strong impacts on firms with poor ratings. Among poorly-rated red and black firms, the impact is generally greater on red-rated firms that are closer to compliance with regulations. The reasons for these responses can be that the incentive for improvement that the Green Watch generates is stronger for firms with poor ratings than those with good ratings, and that the abatement costs for the red-rated firms to achieve compliance are lower than those black rated firms, even though the pressure for improvement can be stronger with the black-rated firms than the red-rated firms.
This research also adds some insights to the growing comparative literature on PRD's. After studying PRD experiences in Indonesia (PROPER) and the Philippines (EcoWatch), Dasgupta et al. [6] argue that PRD programs are most effective in moving moderately non-compliant firms into compliance with regulations, but may provide insufficient incentives to induce significant improvements by the worst performers or firms with good ratings. However, our results for Green Watch indicate significant impacts for firms with good (green and blue) ratings. The stronger result for our four cities in Jiangsu Province may stem from two additional benefits for green-rated firms: (a) Enterprises awarded green in a particular year can be given priority consideration in the selection of enterprises with the best economic and social performance records; and (b) an enterprise that has won green for three consecutive years is given preferential status by provincial environmental regulators. The Jiangsu experience suggests that stronger results can be produced by PRD programs that target highly-rated firms for benefits beyond reputational improvement. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
